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Research that recruits and surveys partici-pants online is increasing, but is subject to fraud whereby study respondents  — whether 
eligible or ineligible — participate multiple times. 
Online Internet research can provide investigators 
with large sample sizes and is cost efficient.1 Inter-
net-based research also provides distance between 
the researchers and participants, allowing the par-
ticipant to remain confidential and/or anonymous, 
and thus to respond to questions freely and honestly 
without worrying about the stigma associated with 
their answers. However, increasing and recurring 
instances of fraudulent activity among subjects raise 
challenges for researchers and Institutional Review 
Boards (IRBs).2 The distance from participants, and 
the potential anonymity and convenience of online 
research allow for individuals to participate easily 
more than once, skewing results and the overall qual-
ity of the data.
Duplicate entries not only compromise the quality 
of the research data, but also impact the studies’ bud-
gets if not caught before participants’ payment — a 
growing concern with decreasing NIH funding lines. 
Though reports have begun to explore methods for 
detecting and preventing fraud,3 the ethical issues and 
IRB considerations involved have received little sys-
tematic attention. Researchers and IRBs may be unfa-
miliar with these issues and thus be overly restrictive 
or lax with Internet research protocols.
In the past, researchers have identified several 
problematic patterns: 1) eligible individuals who take 
a study twice, presumably without malicious intent; 
2) eligible individuals who take a study repeatedly to 
receive additional compensation; and 3) ineligible 
individuals who take a study once or repeatedly to 
profit from compensation.4 Despite using methods 
to detect and prevent fraud, a recent study of trans-
gender and sexual health conducted by Swinburne 
Romine et al. nonetheless, uncovered more serious 
fraudulent behavior. Specifically, these research-
ers found that individuals with IP addresses from 
China participated in the study by creating fake IP 
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addresses and providing U.S. home addresses that, 
upon review, were not residential locations.5 These 
“fraudsters” may not themselves have been in China, 
but may have routed these IP addresses through that 
country in order to avoid detection. Nonetheless, 
after Swinburne Romine et al. first encountered this 
problem in 2011-2012, the media has revealed wide-
spread hacking activities from that country.6 Given 
these phenomena, we decided to review the litera-
ture in light of increasing use of online surveys in 
academic research and potential fraud by survey 
participants.
Early studies regarding Internet-based 
research suggested that multiple submissions 
were a valid concern but were rare,7 below 3% 
in most studies.8 Reasons given for duplicate 
responses to surveys were not due to malicious 
intent, but rather to the respondents’ curios-
ity of how his or her results may change if s/he 
gave different answers,9 entertainment (such as a fun 
game or intellectual challenge), and beliefs that pro-
viding more data — even if duplicate — would aid the 
researchers.10 Prevention strategies have been recom-
mended — such as providing a link to allow respon-
dents, if they want, to continue to participate without 
the responses counting toward the data, and sim-
ply requesting respondents not to participate more 
than once.11 But these strategies do not deter partici-
pants with malicious intent from repeatedly enter-
ing a study. Reips mentions that high incentives may 
increase multiple submissions,12 and Mustanski states 
that different forms of compensation (direct, lottery, 
or a donation to charity of choice) may lead to multiple 
entries, as well as that current prevention strategies 
are ineffective deterrences,13 yet they both fall back on 
the assumption that fraudulent behavior is “extremely 
rare.”14 Birnbaum writes that providing compensation 
or a prize can lead to multiple entries for additional 
compensation or higher chances at winning a prize. 
He suggests that merely stating that participants will 
only be compensated once for their participation is a 
possible solution, but he does not take into account 
sophisticated and/or malicious “fraudsters.”15
Ten years ago when these articles were writ-
ten, incentives were rarely used.16 But over the past 
decade, as response rates have decreased, incentives 
have become more frequent.17 According to a meta-
analysis by Göritz, participants receiving an incentive 
were 19% more likely to respond and 27% more likely 
to complete an online survey than those who did not 
receive an incentive.18 Additionally, incentives have 
been shown to boost retention rates in longitudinal 
studies.19 However, monetary compensation seems 
to be increasing both response rates and multiple 
submissions.20 
We have found only five sexual health studies that 
have examined the frequency of multiple submissions. 
The percentages of entries that were multiple sub-
missions were, respectively, 10% (of which 55% were 
from the same person),21 8% among young men who 
have sex with men (YMSM),22 16% among a sample 
predominantly of heterosexual young adults,23 and 
approximately 33% of the submissions (of which 51% 
of multiple submissions were from subjects who par-
ticipated between 11-67 times).24 In a recent study 
conducted by Bauermeister, of the 2,329 YMSM 
participants who seemed eligible and completed the 
study, 15% of entries were multiple submissions.25 
Bowen et al. concluded that participants eligible for 
reimbursement were six times more likely to engage 
in repeated responses than those who were not offered 
compensation.26 
Discussions concerning the ethics of online research 
often focus on protecting participants’ confidentiality 
to encourage them to trust the researchers.27 But criti-
cal problems can also arise concerning researchers’ 
abilities to trust the participants. Methods of detec-
tion and prevention of both duplicate submissions 
and fraudulent behavior are at times the same, while 
at other times they are different. Hence, we will dis-
cuss both duplicate submissions and fraud below, but 
highlight issues pertaining to “fraudsters” — those 
who are ineligible for studies and participate solely for 
compensation. 
Methods for Detecting and Preventing Fraud
In brief, as indicated in Table 1 and described below, 
several possible methods exist for detecting and pre-
venting fraud, each with pros and cons, and logistical 
and ethical questions and implications. Researchers 
can detect and prevent Internet research fraud in four 
broad ways: at the level of the questionnaire/instru-
ment, the participants’ non-questionnaire data and 
external validation, computer information, and study 
design. Researchers and IRBs face ethical questions of 
whether to report “fraudsters” to external authorities, 
Several possible methods exist for 
detecting and preventing fraud, each 
with pros and cons, and logistical and 
ethical questions and implications.
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Table 1
Methods of Detecting and Preventing Internet Study Duplication and Fraud and Their Implications
Level of 
Intervention
Type of  
Intervention
Method of 
Detection
Method of 
Prevention Pros Cons
Additional 
Ethical Issues
Questionnaire/ 
Instrument 
Questions in 
Survey
Inconsistent 
Reponses
Check for proper/
consistent answers
•  Indicates level 
of attention
•  Can detect 
“bots”
Subjects may 
skip questions 
because of 
discomfort
Include same/simi-
lar/strange ques-
tions throughout 
study
Indicates level 
of attention
Can impact ex-
perimental design
Include questions 
of social desirability
Possibly help as-
sess personality 
traits associated 
with provid-
ing inaccurate 
responses
•  Low, if any, 
predictability
•  If “fraudster” 
not paying at-
tention, then 
questions of so-
cial desirability 
are not helpful
Software for 
Administering 
Survey
No back button Subjects can’t 
easily resubmit 
survey
•  Doesn’t pre-
vent, just makes 
fraud more 
difficult
•  Eligible par-
ticipants may 
want to change 
answers upon 
reflection
Change order of 
questions with 
each administration
•  Indicates level 
of attention
•  Can detect 
“bots”
CAPTCHA* Detects “bots”
Collect paradata 
(i.e., subject’s be-
havior, e.g., time 
stamp, how mouse 
moved on the 
screen)
Examines 
how subject 
responding to 
survey
Programs that 
allow tracking 
of paradata are 
costly
Ethical questions 
of what we can 
see with para-
data – whether 
to disclose to 
participants 
what we can see 
of their behavior
and whether and how to include these methods in an 
informed consent form.
Questionnaire/Instrument Level
Questions in Survey
Researchers have suspected fraudulent behavior from 
the inconsistent responses participants provide.28 For 
example, Romine et al. excluded participants whose 
ages did not match birth dates or whose answers to 
questions about sex, gender, and sexuality were incon-
sistent (e.g., I was born with a penis/I have had genital 
reconstructive surgery/I still have a penis; I have had 
insertive vaginal sex with multiple female partners/
None of my partners have vaginas).29 Researchers can 
also check that participants have not answered in an 
“All or Nothing” manner (i.e., answering all 0s or 6s 
in a survey, or following other patterns of responding 
[e.g., 1,2,3,4,1,2,3,4]),30 or skipped large portions of 
the survey. However, participants may skip questions 
due to discomfort answering particular questions, and 
*Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart
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Level of 
Intervention
Type of  
Intervention
Method of 
Detection
Method of 
Prevention Pros Cons
Additional 
Ethical Issues
Tracking Non-
Questionnaire 
Data
Personal 
Information
Similar/
same email, 
username, 
password 
between 
“different” 
participants
Contact participant 
about “red flag,” 
and if no response, 
remove from study 
Clears up mis-
understandings 
•  Could yield a 
response bias 
•  Could deter eli-
gible subjects 
•  Doesn’t stop 
multiple dissimi-
lar email, user-
name, password
Needs to bal-
ance protecting 
integrity of data 
and subject 
privacy and 
confidentiality 
are particularly 
important
Inaccurate/
fake address 
& phone 
numbers
Researchers re-
quest to provide 
phone number/
address to get 
through registra-
tion process
Participants 
need valid  
number in 
order to 
proceed
“Fraudsters” can 
create temporary 
phone numbers 
Check whether 
person, address, 
phone number 
is valid (through 
Facebook, whitep-
ages.com, etc.)
•  Confirms for 
consistent 
information
•  Deters 
“fraudsters” 
and multiple 
submissions
•  Can discourage 
eligible partici-
pants from tak-
ing part
•  Subjects do not 
always have ex-
ternal validation 
data to ensure 
eligibility
Ask participants for 
a website where 
they are listed (e.g., 
Facebook)
May deter 
“fraudsters” 
and multiple 
submissions
•  Can discourage 
eligible partici-
pants from tak-
ing part
•  May encourage 
“fraudsters” to 
provide fake 
information 
(e.g., creating 
fake Facebook 
account)
not necessarily due to fraudulent behavior. Neverthe-
less, examining the types of questions skipped, and 
how those questions were answered could be helpful 
in determining discomfort or lack of attention. Simi-
larly, Nosek et al. suggest including choices to survey 
questions that are not likely to be true.31 Participants 
who are not taking the survey seriously may be more 
likely to select an odd response, though this strategy 
should be used sparingly, as it may impact the experi-
mental design. 
Including questions about social desirability/sociop-
athy could potentially identify personality traits corre-
lated with providing inaccurate responses.32 However, 
tests of such personality traits may have low, if any, 
predictability for intentional fraud behavior, as “fraud-
sters” may not respond to these questions honestly. 
Lastly, some entries can be submitted by “bots,” 
instead of individuals. “Bots,” short for “robots,” are 
a type of software application that can perform auto-
mated tasks over the Internet at a much quicker pace 
than individuals can. Thus, “bots” can fill out surveys 
quickly and repeatedly, allowing for the bots’ program-
mers to complete surveys and receive additional com-
pensation quickly. For example, in 1999, Slashdot.com 
created an online poll asking which was the best grad-
uate school in computer science. Students at Carnegie 
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Table 1 (continued…)
Methods of Detecting and Preventing Internet Study Duplication and Fraud and Their Implications
Level of 
Intervention
Type of  
Intervention
Method of 
Detection
Method of 
Prevention Pros Cons
Additional 
Ethical Issues
Computer 
Information
IP Addresses Same IP as 
another 
participant
Check whether IP 
address is the same 
or if it is encrypted
Can determine 
how many times 
participants 
took survey and 
whether partici-
pant fulfills loca-
tion criteria (i.e., 
living in US)
•  IP addresses 
may be shared 
(roommates, 
university/cof-
fee shop) 
•  IP addresses 
can be en-
crypted/scram-
bled/fake (e.g., 
using US IP ad-
dress abroad)
•  Programs to 
check re-rout-
ing IP addresses 
are costly
•  If eligible par-
ticipant takes 
survey multiple 
times, should 
researchers 
trust the initial 
survey?
•  Privacy Issue 
(is an IP ad-
dress personal 
information/
identification?) 
•  Should con-
sent forms 
mention that 
researchers 
are tracking/
not tracking IP 
addresses?
Block IP address 
if participant is 
ineligible
Avoids “fraud-
sters” from 
participating 
Could be dy-
namic IP address 
and not ineligible 
participant
Internet 
Cookies
Cookies 
detecting 
completion 
of study and 
multiple at-
tempts access 
study
Enable cookies Can detect 
multiple submis-
sions by track-
ing the prog-
ress/completion 
of study
•  “Fraudsters” 
can disable 
cookies
•  “Fraudsters” 
can use differ-
ent browsers
•  Computers may 
be legitimately 
shared (e.g., 
computer labs 
or roommates)
•  If “fraudsters” 
use multiple 
usernames, 
cookies would 
not be able to 
detect multiple 
submissions
•  Can reveal 
personal infor-
mation if some-
one checks 
cookies on the 
computer (e.g., 
parents see-
ing their child 
took part in 
a study about 
homosexuals)
•  Administering 
cookies with-
out people’s 
knowledge. 
•  How should 
researchers 
inform partici-
pants of cook-
ies without 
discouraging 
eligible par-
ticipants from 
taking part?
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Level of 
Intervention
Type of  
Intervention
Method of 
Detection
Method of 
Prevention Pros Cons
Additional 
Ethical Issues
Tracking Survey 
URL
URL posted 
in unintended 
locations
Tracking/Googling 
URL on Internet
Can see if 
website where 
URL located is 
targeting proper 
audience
Doesn’t prevent 
“frausters” taking 
study multiple 
times
Provide link in 
email to website 
and track referring 
URL
•  Can control 
who receives 
email
•  Can avoid en-
tries submitted 
that were not 
from the email
Researchers 
don’t always 
know the tar-
geted population
Study Design Informed 
Consent
Break up consent 
online and only 
provide compensa-
tion information at 
the end of all the 
forms
•  Subjects need 
to pay at-
tention; and 
creates longer 
process to 
receive com-
pensation, 
discouraging 
“fraudsters”
•  Reduces 
“bots” from 
entering the 
system
May deter eligible 
participants
Compensation Many gift 
certificates 
mailed to 
same address
Mention that sub-
jects will not be 
compensated if 
suspect of fraudu-
lent behavior
Avoids paying 
“fraudsters” yet 
keeps incentive
Only inform par-
ticipants of their 
eligibility for the 
study after survey
•  Avoids paying 
“fraudsters” yet 
keeps incentive
•  Gives re-
searchers time 
to review and 
determine 
“fraudsters”
•  Delayed 
gratification 
may deter 
“fraudsters”
Ask for mailing 
address (vs. email 
address) and verify 
addresses
Deters ineligible 
participants if 
researchers 
have means to 
verify addresses
May deter eligible 
participants (be-
cause of need to 
provide personal 
information)
Check if multiple 
gift certificates are 
being sent to one 
location
Can avoid paying 
participants if sus-
pected of fraudu-
lent behavior yet 
keeps incentive
Linking identi-
fication to data 
can threaten 
confidentiality
Table 1 (continued…)
Methods of Detecting and Preventing Internet Study Duplication and Fraud and Their Implications
122 journal of law, medicine & ethics
INDEPENDENT
Level of 
Intervention
Type of  
Intervention
Method of 
Detection
Method of 
Prevention Pros Cons
Additional 
Ethical Issues
De-incentivize 
fraud by paying less 
and/or emphasiz-
ing research and 
the importance of 
social/community 
costs of fraud
Potential “fraud-
sters” may be 
persuaded not 
to skew results 
•  Deters eligible 
participants 
if compensa-
tion not large 
enough
•  “Fraudsters” 
may not care 
about impor-
tance of re-
search or costs
•  Gives people 
the idea to en-
gage in fraudu-
lent behavior
Provide lottery 
for compensation 
(do not pay every 
person)
Gives research-
ers time to 
review and de-
termine “fraud-
sters” before 
compensating
•  Lottery may not 
be enough of in-
centive for eligi-
ble participants 
to take part
•  “Fraudsters” 
may take survey 
more often 
to increase 
chances of 
winning
Including 
Interview
See whether 
subject 
already par-
ticipated and/
or is lying on 
responses
Audio Interview •  May deter 
“fraud-
sters” from 
participating
•  Another 
means to de-
tect lying
•  Fraud can be 
hard to detect 
(“good liars”)
•  Lose anonym-
ity – could dis-
courage eligible 
participants
Needs to bal-
ance protecting 
integrity of data 
and subject 
privacy and 
confidentiality 
are particularly 
important
Skype/”face-to-
face” Interview
IRBs IRB Structure Having an online/
computer expert 
as a member of 
the IRB
•  Has ability 
to assess the 
study at hand 
and find ap-
propriate bal-
ance to pro-
tect subjects 
and ensure 
data quality
•  Can be up-
to-date as 
technology and 
“fraudsters” 
advance to un-
derstand how 
to best prevent 
“fraudsters”
Does not deter 
“fraudsters” from 
taking survey 
multiple times
Table 1 (continued…)
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Mellon and MIT wrote a voting program using “bots” 
to complete the ballots, resulting in over 21,000 votes 
for each of these schools, while every other school 
submitted fewer than 1,000 votes.33 Similarly, Bauer-
meister has conducted studies where their own sys-
tem detected “bots” after flagging rapid re-entries into 
the system from the same IP address and random-
ized answer patterns from these entries. As suggested 
above, researchers can review inconsistent answers 
(though often needing to do so by hand) to remove 
submissions from “bots” as well as “fraudsters.”
Software for Administering Surveys
Online survey software can be engineered to help 
prevent Internet fraud. Disabling the back button on 
the web-browser can prevent “fraudsters” from going 
back through the survey and revising and resubmit-
ting their responses easily. However, legitimate par-
ticipants may change their mind about an answer 
upon greater reflection, and may legitimately want to 
alter a previous response but would be unable to do 
so. To solve this issue, the survey could be constructed 
to allow respondents to review answers periodically. 
Investigators can also construct the survey to change 
Level of 
Intervention
Type of  
Intervention
Method of 
Detection
Method of 
Prevention Pros Cons
Additional 
Ethical Issues
Have PIs Report 
Information on 
“Fraudsters” 
to IRB
 IRBs can follow 
and monitor to 
make appropriate 
decisions for cur-
rent and future 
studies
May deter 
“fraud-
sters” from 
participating
•  May deter 
legitimate 
participants
•  “Fraudsters” 
can create new 
names, emails, 
IP addresses for 
each study to 
avoid detection 
as a “fraudster”
Broader 
Regulatory
and other 
Entities
Reporting In-
formation on 
“Fraudsters”
PIs create “fraud-
ster” list for other 
PIs and share 
information
•  PIs can have 
a list as a 
reference to 
easily remove 
“fraudster” 
entries
•  May deter 
“fraud-
sters” from 
participating
 “Fraudsters” 
can create new 
names, emails, 
IP addresses for 
each study to 
avoid detection 
as a “fraudster”
Possible harm 
of individuals 
are incorrectly 
classified as 
“fraudsters” and 
reported ex-
ternally? Need 
to ensure that 
characterization 
as “fraudster” is 
accurate
Reporting fraudu-
lent behavior to 
Internet Crime 
Complaint Center 
(IC3.gov), OHRP 
or funders
May deter 
“fraud-
sters” from 
participating
•  May deter 
legitimate par-
ticipants (some 
may wonder if 
researchers will 
extend report-
ing to include 
other illicit 
activities)
•  “Fraudsters” 
can create new 
names, emails, 
IP addresses for 
each study to 
avoid detection 
as a “fraudster”
Table 1 (continued…)
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the order of the questions with each administration, 
so answers that do not match the questions would be 
flagged as suspicious.
“Bots” are also commonly prevented by Completely 
Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers 
and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA), which frequently 
requires the user to type in letters and numbers from 
a distorted image that a computer cannot copy, to 
ensure that the respondent is indeed a person and 
not a “bot.” This approach, however, may decrease the 
participation of individuals with low computer liter-
acy, who have visual disabilities (though some CAPT-
CHA programs offer an audio/sound option), and/
or have outdated computer systems that do not work 
appropriately with CAPTCHA.34 Additionally, not all 
CAPTCHA codes are secure, allowing “bots” to invade 
the system. Some CAPTCHA codes are also used fre-
quently, motivating programmers to create “bots” that 
can bypass these common CAPTCHAs.35
Researchers can check other information beyond 
what participants provide through the survey’s tech-
nology. Reviewing the administrative data, also known 
as paradata, on each subject’s behavior can indicate if 
participants paid attention to the content of the ques-
tions or changed answers, potentially shedding light 
on whether the participant is confused or deliberately 
being dishonest.36 A researcher can look at the time-
stamp, the length of time it took participants to take 
the study, the ways their mouse moved on the screen, 
the deletions or changes in their answers, and more. 
Miner, Bockting and colleagues removed submissions 
if participants took fewer than 30 minutes to com-
plete the survey, or fewer than 19 minutes to complete 
the three most important portions of the survey.37 
These cut-offs were based on the overall distribution 
of respondents’ completion times. In each case the 
cut-off was set at greater than two standard deviations 
from the mean completion time. 
It is important to note, however, that paradata are 
generally included in relatively costly, private survey 
programs such as Sawtooth Software,38 and not acces-
sible through other, “free” survey systems, such as Sur-
veyMonkey.39 With Sawtooth Software, for example, 
only researchers have access to participants’ informa-
tion (paradata and other information) as the data may 
be deposited into the researchers’ own data server.40 
Easily accessible online survey tools like SurveyMon-
key, on the other hand, may store the information in 
their data servers and in their terms of agreement 
may include their right to review participants’ data.41 
Hence, the researchers are not the only ones with 
access to this information — raising concerns regard-
ing the survey’s confidentiality when used in these 
systems. Other public surveys like Qualtrics may store 
the paradata for free, yet for a fee allow the researchers 
alone to store and access these data.42 Consequently, 
researchers and IRBs must be cautious of which sur-
vey service is used to avoid breaches in data safety and 
security. 
Tracking Participants Non-Questionnaire 
Data
As discussed more fully below, investigators can obtain 
additional information about participants outside 
the questionnaire in the form of general information 
(username, password) or through the computer (IP 
addresses, cookies). These methods each pose both 
similar and different ethical issues. 
Personal Information
Similar or Same Email, Username, and/or  
Passwords among Participants 
Investigators can check for the same or similar email 
addresses, usernames, or passwords among partici-
pants in the study. Effective cross-referencing may 
reveal that a username in one entry is similar to an 
email address in another entry. However, certain com-
mon usernames or passwords among participants 
(e.g., 123456) may not indicate suspicious activity,43 
but may, in fact, be a way for subjects to take part in 
the study without providing personal information. 
Removing all such frequent usernames and/or pass-
words as duplicates from the study could thus result 
in losing important data. Moreover, “fraudsters” may 
have multiple, dissimilar, valid email addresses that 
researchers would not be able to detect. Other means 
of detection would thus need to be used.
To ensure valid entries are counted while avoiding 
“fraudsters,” researchers can also contact participants 
about the duplicate entries to clear up any misun-
derstandings that might have occurred. Bowen et al. 
deactivated accounts that were identified as multiple 
submissions and participants were sent a message 
to contact the project due to a problem with their 
account, and no subjects asked to be reactivated.44
However, contacting participants about “red flags” 
can dissuade eligible participants, and/or yield a 
response bias, and risk excluding valid data. Addi-
tionally, contacting participants can reveal to “fraud-
sters” the methods researchers use to detect fraud, 
thus helping the “fraudsters” to cheat the system more 
effectively. Researchers may find it advantageous not 
to reveal explicitly what was flagged as suspicious, 
so that fraudulent participants will not know how 
researchers detected the fraudulent behavior. 
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Phony Address/Phone Number/Birth Date  —  
External Validation
Checking the name, address, phone number, and age 
and birth date of participants to determine whether 
participants provided accurate and unique informa-
tion can prevent both ineligible participants from tak-
ing part in the study and eligible participants from 
taking part multiple times.45 Yet participants can pro-
vide friends’ addresses or phone numbers or a work 
address or phone number to appear as two different 
participants, or provide fake addresses and phone 
numbers.46 Similarly, in Romine et al., phone num-
bers were required to complete the registration pro-
cess (an automated robocall to their number of record 
then provided a PIN that would allow the participant 
to continue with the registration process), yet “fraud-
sters” set up and used temporary Google numbers to 
circumvent this step.47
Additionally, investigators can confirm subjects’ 
eligibility through external validation such as look-
ing up the individual through publicly available 
search engines, or checking websites such as Face-
book or LinkedIn. Bauermeister’s study found that 
using Facebook and MySpace were most helpful in 
straightening out suspicious data. However, partici-
pants did not always have an account for verification, 
and sometimes privacy restrictions were activated 
or the profile was associated with a different email 
address.48 Researchers can also use Google Earth/
Google Maps, whitepages.com, Accurint (which has 
access to individual’s driver’s licenses and birthdates, 
among other records), and NCOA (National Change 
of Address, a database of changes of address that have 
been filed) to determine and confirm valid addresses 
and phone numbers. Unfortunately, eligible partic-
ipants may be discouraged from taking part in the 
study if researchers look at information beyond what 
participants provide for the study. A solution to this 
issue could be to make providing personal informa-
tion optional. Bowen et al. requested that partici-
pants include their phone numbers for follow-up and 
retention, yet this request was optional. Bowen and 
colleagues then used “reverse look-up” on the Inter-
net to determine whether the phone number was 
valid.49 Providing optional personal information may 
be a good way to facilitate participation since eli-
gible subjects can remain anonymous and comfort-
able. But fraudulent participants may also opt-out of 
providing information that might identify them as 
ineligible. 
To confirm eligibility, investigators can ask partici-
pants to provide a website where they are listed. This 
request can deter ineligible participants from taking 
the survey and deter eligible participants from taking 
the survey more than once, since they cannot assume 
another identity without proof. However, both eligible 
and ineligible participants can provide fake informa-
tion (creating a fake Facebook account, for example) 
which would “confirm” eligibility yet be completely 
inaccurate.50 Moreover, eligible participants may also 
be deterred from participating. 
Publicly-available online information about sub-
jects, if collected without interacting with an indi-
vidual, would presumably not be considered human 
subject research, and would not require informed con-
sent. Thus, examining outside sources might appear 
similar to Humphreys’ tearoom trade study, where he 
collected individuals’ license plates without inform-
ing them, obtained their names and addresses and 
contacted them. However, Humphrey’s study was 
deemed unethical in part because the researcher col-
lected data on individuals without their consent in 
order to identify and later contact these individuals.51 
Collecting information on individuals separate from 
what is collected as part of the survey would not be 
used to gather identifying information that subjects 
wish to withhold, as was the case with Humphrey’s 
study. But questions nevertheless arise as to whether 
subjects should be told that such information would 
be collected. Individuals who make information pub-
licly available on the Internet presumably should not 
have expectations that the information is private and 
confidential. Nonetheless, these individuals may mis-
takenly think that information they provide online is 
private, when that is not in fact the case (e.g., com-
panies may sell data on online customer purchasing 
behavior). These individuals may also scroll through 
and unwittingly accept legal agreements that limit 
their privacy, but not understand these legal state-
ments. Researchers could also include in the consent 
form that they will be seeking external validation of 
subject information. 
These strategies raise questions of what is consid-
ered personal identifiable information. As Ohm points 
out, providing date of birth, sex, and zip code — three 
seemingly vague, innocuous descriptions — can accu-
rately identify a person 87% of the time.52 Participants 
might be hesitant to provide potentially identifying 
information, especially if the questions are sensitive or 
personal; hence researchers must be careful to ensure 
participants of the confidentiality of information to 
encourage eligible subjects to participate. 
Computer Information
IP Addresses
Researchers can detect multiple entries through track-
ing the IP address of the computer used to take the 
survey. Investigators can see how many times the par-
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ticipant took the survey and whether the participant 
meets geographic location eligibility (i.e., a survey may 
only want to study residents of the U.S.; IP addresses 
would reveal the participants’ geographic location). 
If researchers see an IP address used by many par-
ticipants, or an IP address from the wrong geographic 
location, researchers can identify those participants 
and block those IP addresses, thus preventing partici-
pants from taking the study again.53
However, problems arise when multiple eligible par-
ticipants complete the survey from the same computer 
(e.g., roommates), or a study is being conducted on a 
large campus where students on the network receive the 
same IP addresses at different points in time.54 Some 
companies that offer internet connectivity at home 
may also have rotating IP addresses for an area. Con-
sequently, depending on a given day, a home may have 
two different IP addresses. Without fixed IP addresses, 
one participant may have different IP addresses, creat-
ing problems in determining whether entries are from 
“fraudsters” or are merely a single individual with an IP 
address that legitimately rotates. Additionally, eligible 
participants may be traveling outside a required geo-
graphic location while taking the study, in which case 
a foreign IP address will show up, raising unnecessary 
red flags. Yet respondents could potentially be asked if 
the computer they are using is not their usual one, and if 
so, why. Bauermeister and colleagues, as well as Bowen 
et al., used other prevention techniques to determine 
if entries with the same IP address were valid (time 
completion, asking how many people use the com-
puter, etc.), and concluded that some were indeed valid 
entries with duplicate IP addresses.55 
In addition, IP addresses can be encrypted, scram-
bled or even faked; “fraudsters” can obtain a U.S. IP 
address in a different country, preventing researchers 
from knowing exactly where the participant is, and 
whether s/he has taken the survey multiple times. 
Indeed, after further examination in the Romine 
study of transgender individuals in the U.S., IP 
addresses were registered to people from China who 
fit the study’s category of “fraudsters.” While it was 
not certain where some of the other “fraudsters” were 
located, the researchers realized that these individuals 
were making efforts to produce multiple false records. 
This realization prompted the researchers to review 
the demographic information that was provided and 
determine fake addresses in order to systematically 
remove these participant records.56 Similar to para-
data, there are costly tracking systems that can deter-
mine if someone is re-routing an IP address.
Researchers’ examination of IP addresses poses sev-
eral ethical questions. Researchers may deem a partic-
ipant’s first entry valid, and the subsequent entries as 
duplicates or fraudulent. Yet, researchers should con-
sider whether the first entry should be deemed valid, 
as it may not be an eligible participant submitting 
multiple times, but rather an ineligible “fraudster.” By 
reviewing the results both with and without the first 
entry, researchers can see how the entries impacted 
the data.
Additionally, while the United States does not con-
sider IP addresses to be personal information/iden-
tification (except for HIPAA purposes),57 the Euro-
pean Union does.58 European participants may not 
want to participate if IP addresses will be tracked, 
posing problems in conducting research internation-
ally. Researchers may thus be limited in their ability 
to track IP addresses and face questions of whether 
to list such tracking in the consent form. Anecdotally, 
some IRBs have initially been wary of researchers col-
lecting IP addresses, viewing this information as iden-
tifying and unnecessary for answering the research 
questions per se. In a study conducted by Bauermeis-
ter, the IRB first discouraged researchers from track-
ing IP addresses (despite the fact that the U.S. does 
not consider IP addresses to be personal information/
identification). Upon explaining to the IRB the need 
for this personal data, the IRB agreed but required 
the researchers to include in the consent form that 
IP addresses would be tracked. Yet researchers and 
these committees should consider the possibilities 
that collection of this information is justified in order 
to ensure research integrity, and hence scientific and 
social benefits. A balance of what to track and how to 
convey this information will be discussed later.
Internet Cookies
Internet cookies are bits of data sent from a website 
that are stored in an individual user’s web browser 
while the user is visiting that website. Each time the 
individual user accesses the site, the browser sends the 
cookie back to the website with information about the 
user’s previous activity. Cookies can also detect if an 
individual has accessed and/or completed a survey, as 
well as track the URL to determine from where online 
participants accessed the survey. If the individual 
attempts to access the website from the same browser, 
the cookies can detect if the individual has completed 
the survey and can note additional attempts to com-
plete the survey. 
Researchers can also provide a link to the survey 
exclusively in an email, thereby controlling the num-
ber of times participants can access the survey, as 
cookies can show researchers the number of times on 
which a link was clicked, and investigators can thus 
detect “fraudsters.” Van Gelder et al. suggested recruit-
ing a targeted population via email with a link to a 
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password-protected study in the email.59 A username 
would be assigned to each individual who received 
the email, so that multiple entries could be prevented, 
and recruiting a targeted population would obclude 
“fraudsters” from participating.
Relying on cookies presents several challenges. Par-
ticipants can access the survey from different brows-
ers or delete the cookies stored on their computers, 
preventing researchers from knowing whether par-
ticipants have taken the study multiple times. Fur-
thermore, if multiple usernames/emails are provided, 
cookies would not be able to detect multiple submis-
sions from the same user. Cookies can also reveal 
and identify someone as a participant in a study; 
for instance, parents may check the cookies of their 
teen’s computer and see that s/he participated in an 
LGBT survey. Regarding recruitment via email, Van 
Gelder et al. suggested that IRBs may be disinclined 
to recruit participants via individualized email,60 and/
or researchers may not know in advance the email 
addresses of all the potential participants (e.g., con-
ducting a study on groups that are not easily identi-
fied, such as many substance abusers). 
Additionally, investigators can enable cookies to be 
stored on subjects’ hard disk on their computers with-
out the subjects’ knowledge or consent. Alternatively, 
some websites issue a pop-up before the user accesses 
any of the website’s contents, noting that by continu-
ing to use the website, the individual agrees to accept 
cookies on the website. While enabling cookies may 
assist in detecting “fraudsters” and multiple submis-
sions, informing participants of cookies may discour-
age eligible subjects from participating. 
Similar to IP addresses, enabling cookies may pre-
vent eligible participants who live together or share 
a computer from participating, if the researcher’s 
software detects that the study has already been con-
ducted from the shared computer. If multiple individ-
uals use the same computer, researchers should decide 
if cookies should be enabled. If so, the researchers will 
in effect only be able to include one participant from 
each shared computer, losing eligible participants. 
Tracking Survey URL
Tracking the referring URL and/or searching for the 
URL online can show researchers if the enrollment 
site has been posted elsewhere. There are websites 
that post links to studies for users intending to earn 
easy money (such as paidsurveysonline.
com, onlinejunkie.com, ranksurveys.com 
and swagbucks.com),61 so knowing where 
the URL has been posted allows research-
ers to see where participants are hearing 
about the study and researchers can then 
act accordingly to have the re-posting 
taken down. This situation in fact occurred 
in the Romine study: participants notified 
the researchers, sending screen captures of 
a chat room where users were mocking and 
planning to fraud the study.62 While this 
method does not prevent eligible participants from 
taking the study multiple times, it controls where 
the study is advertised and can help avoid ineligible 
participants.
Study Design Level
Elements of the study’s design, such as breaking up the 
consent form, controlling how participants are com-
pensated, and including a face-to-face, online chat or 
Skype interview as part of the study, can help prevent 
Internet research fraud. 
Informed Consent
Investigators can provide the informed consent form 
online not as one long document, but instead as sepa-
rate sections and webpages requiring the participants’ 
consent for each section of the form as it appeared 
on the screen. The compensation component of the 
informed consent would be listed at the end. Research-
ers can have the order of consent options (YES, I agree 
vs. NO, I don’t agree) randomized at each page. This 
process requires participants to pay more attention to 
what they are clicking, and creates a longer process 
to receive the compensation, as opposed to scrolling 
down quickly through the consent form and “consent-
ing” to the study. These mechanisms can also help 
reduce “bots” from entering the system. Additionally, 
not knowing the compensation initially may discour-
age some “fraudsters” from participating, as they may 
find that the time is not worth it, given that the amount 
of compensation is not clear initially, though eligible 
participants may also be discouraged if the survey is 
too long and compensation is unknown. While this 
new structure of the consent form does not detect 
“fraudsters” or multiple submissions, it can help pre-
vent these situations from initially occurring. 
Elements of the study’s design, such as 
breaking up the consent form, controlling 
how participants are compensated, and 
including a face-to-face, online chat or 
Skype interview as part of the study, can help 
prevent Internet research fraud.
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Compensation
Altering the amount, description or type and timing of 
compensation can also help prevent fraudulent activ-
ity. Studies have suggested that lowering incentives 
would lower fraudulent behavior.63 Researchers may 
also be able to de-emphasize the incentive by paying 
participants less money, or emphasizing the social 
and community benefits of the study and the costs of 
fraud. By focusing on the importance of the research 
and the costs of fraud, some participants may feel less 
inclined to submit duplicates or falsify results. Bau-
ermeister et al. sent out an email post-survey about 
the harmful effects of fraudulent behavior in studies 
to participants suspected of fraudulent behavior and 
two of the participants apologized.64 The note stated:
Dear Participant,
 We appreciate your interest and willingness to 
complete our survey. Unfortunately, we noticed 
irregularities during data collection. Specifi-
cally, a few individuals chose to provide false 
data, refer ineligible individuals, and/or create 
multiple entries so that they may receive one 
or more incentives. We cannot underscore how 
disappointing this has been for us. Legally, this 
behavior constitutes fraud.
 As public health practitioners, we strive to collect 
quality and robust data through research that 
will inform smoking prevention and sex educa-
tion programs for young women.  False data 
diminishes our ability and actually harms the 
population that we seek to help through science 
and social services. 
 We hope that similar events will not occur in 
future efforts.  It is only through the honesty, 
integrity, and willingness of participants that 
we can help to contribute to the health of our 
communities.
 If you are receiving this message, you will not 
receive an incentive; however, if you think that 
this e-mail is a mistake, please feel free to call us 
during regular business hours.
However, lowering incentive may also lower participa-
tion rates. In addition, some “fraudsters” may not care 
about the costs of fraud. 
Instead of paying all participants in the study, 
researchers can alternatively provide a lottery for 
compensation, whereby a smaller number of par-
ticipants are randomly chosen to receive a larger 
amount of compensation. This mechanism can also 
give researchers time to review and identify fraudu-
lent participants before sending out compensation. 
But “fraudsters” may take the survey multiple times to 
increase their chances of winning.65
Other prevention methods include stating that par-
ticipants will not be compensated if they are found 
by the researchers to have submitted duplicate and/
or ineligible entries. Researchers can also monitor 
whether multiple gift certificates are being sent to 
one location. In Romine’s study, the  sales represen-
tative from  giftcertificates.com  was able to provide 
redemption reports that allowed research staff to con-
firm when a single email address redeemed excessive 
certificates.66 
Investigators can ask participants, too, for a mailing 
address instead of an email address in order to verify 
legitimate residential location, detering participants 
from providing phony email addresses. However, pro-
viding personal information, which can also link iden-
tification to data, might discourage eligible subjects 
from participating. Rosser and colleagues allowed 
participants to choose their method of payment to 
accommodate respondents’ comfort levels with ano-
nymity,67 yet this method would make identifying 
“fraudsters” more difficult. 
In addition, investigators can delay compensation 
for initial or follow up portions of the studies, giv-
ing researchers time to review and determine which 
participants are fraudulent before sending out com-
pensation. Providing compensation at follow-up por-
tions of a study rather, or proportionally more, than 
at baseline may increase response and retention rates, 
and delayed gratification of compensation may also 
de-incentivize people from answering a survey mul-
tiple times. As discussed below, empirical research is 
needed to examine the potential effectiveness of these 
approaches.
Including Interview
Researchers can include an interview component to 
the study via online written, audio, or video chat (e.g., 
Skype).68 Face-to-face interviews may be difficult to 
arrange as participants may be spread out geographi-
cally and even across different states or countries. Fur-
thermore, Skype/videochat interviews may be more 
effective than written chat or audio-only interviews not 
only for potentially facilitating and enhancing quali-
tative interviews, but perhaps also for screening pur-
poses. Such interviews provide another possible means 
to deter or detect lying, but may also deter eligible indi-
viduals from participating, as anonymity may be less 
pronounced. Moreover, interviews are not a foolproof 
system as “good liars” may be hard to detect.69
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Taking Action against “Fraudsters”  
Outside the Study
Questions arise as to whether researchers and/or IRBs 
ever need to report cases of fraud to others, and if so, 
when and to whom. Researchers could, for instance, 
communicate with other researchers to share infor-
mation about specific “fraudsters” — i.e., to make a 
database. Mentioning the possibility of such a data-
base in the informed consent forms might dissuade 
“fraudsters” but also may dissuade legitimate par-
ticipants. However, such a database can potentially 
be useful. On the other hand, “fraudsters” may create 
unique fictitious online identities for each study, such 
that the names, emails, and IP addresses they provide 
may not be repeated among studies. Nonetheless, as 
more online studies are conducted, the numbers of 
“fraudsters” will presumably continue to pose prob-
lems, and these other methods may be worth studying 
for effectiveness. Investigators can assess, for instance, 
how often they detect identical information from 
“fraudsters” in different studies. 
Once researchers identify fraudulent behavior, 
they face additional decisions. Questions emerge of 
whether, in extreme circumstances, researchers may 
want to file a complaint with the Internet Crime Com-
plaint Center (IC3.gov) — a section of the FBI that 
deals with Internet crimes70 — and include a warn-
ing in the consent form that reporting may occur. 
Such a warning could powerfully deter fraudulent 
behavior, but may frighten eligible participants, who 
may wonder whether researchers may extend govern-
ment reporting to include other illicit activities (e.g., 
drug use). Further scholarly discussion and debate 
is needed to determine what behaviors, if any, might 
warrant such action (e.g., if individuals went to great 
lengths to defraud researchers of government funds). 
Certificates of confidentiality (CoCs) from the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) are intended to 
help investigators protect data from involuntary dis-
closure if subpoenaed by a court. Yet the potential 
usefulness and limitations of CoCs remain unclear 
since very few have been challenged in court. This cer-
tificate does not cover voluntary or intentional disclo-
sure of information by researchers — e.g., in the case 
of state reporting if a subject divulges child abuse, or 
reportable communicative diseases, providing these 
limitations are included in the informed consent.71 
Hence, this certificate may enable researchers to pro-
tect data from subpoenas, but allow researchers to 
divulge information about fraudulent activity if they 
think that doing so is necessary.
Cross-Cutting Ethical Concerns
Clearly, ethical considerations arise with each of these 
approaches. These methods differ in the ethical and 
logistical issues and the specific nature and degree of 
tradeoffs they present. Yet across individual strate-
gies, researchers and IRBs confront tensions of how 
to weigh risks and benefits of each approach — how 
to include in a study means of checking the valid-
ity of subjects and their responses without deterring 
legitimate subjects from participating. Two underly-
ing ethical principles conflict here: maximizing the 
scientific and social benefits of research vs. respecting 
the autonomy of subjects (e.g., by decreasing risks of 
breaches of confidentiality). It is possible that these 
two goals cannot both be wholly met simultaneously. 
That is, effective means of reducing “fraudsters” may 
inevitably deter some potential subjects from enroll-
ing in a study. However, an optimum balance may be 
possible to achieve. Specifically, vigorous efforts to sig-
nificantly reduce or eliminate “fraudsters” can ensure 
the validity of the data, maximizing its scientific and 
social benefit. The costs may be that some legitimate 
subjects do not participate, and that researchers thus 
need to make additional efforts to recruit necessary 
sample sizes. However, these additional resources 
appear justified by the result: optimally valid data. 
Difficult ethical questions emerge, however, as to 
whether researchers need to disclose to participants 
all methods the researchers will use to detect and 
prevent fraud (e.g., collecting IP addresses; search-
ing for subjects online; and enabling cookies on sub-
jects’ computers), and if so, to what degree. On the one 
hand, such disclosure respects subjects’ rights to be 
informed of all relevant aspects of the study, and may 
deter “fraudsters.” However, legitimate participants 
may then be deterred from participating as well, and 
such disclosures may alert “fraudsters” to seek strat-
egies to elude these protections — e.g., creating fake 
Facebook accounts, listing fake names, etc. Creating a 
fake online presence may seem to require a significant 
amount of effort for a “fraudster” and thus disincen-
tivize such behavior, but compensation for some stud-
ies with multiple stages over a few years can add up 
to hundreds of dollars. Bockting, Miner, and Hoefer’s 
study provided each subject a total of $180 if partici-
pants successfully completed all tasks,72 and Rosser 
et al.’s study provided $80 for completing the pretest, 
intervention and post-test, and an additional $20–25 
for completing each follow-up survey.73 The overseas 
currency conversion rate can also attract “fraudsters” 
abroad more than from the U.S., making foreign 
“fraudsters” think that these efforts are worthwhile.
Researchers and IRBs have three options here to 
include in the informed consent documents: 1) all 
130 journal of law, medicine & ethics
INDEPENDENT
information about these methods, 2) no such informa-
tion, or 3) general and/or oblique references to such 
methods. Ethically, disclosing all methods respects 
subjects’ rights most. Disclosure of collection of IP 
addresses can also be important since, as in any study, 
breaches of confidentiality may occur, posing risks to 
subjects. Yet, for the reasons discussed above, these 
disclosures may threaten, too, to decrease the scientific 
and social benefit of the study. Hence, it appears that 
these competing pros and cons can best be balanced 
via an intermediary approach: disclosing the fact that 
certain measures will be taken, without divulging the 
details involved (i.e., not mentioning the specifics, 
such as collection of IP addresses). At the same time, 
since risks in any study should be minimized, security 
protections, such as use of firewalls and encryption of 
data, are essential. 
While these various methods share certain underly-
ing ethical tensions, other ethical issues differ some-
what between these approaches. Specifically, these 
methods vary in the amount of personal information 
they obtain and/or their degree of invasiveness – i.e., 
how much they may be considered to impinge on 
subject autonomy and/or raise additional concerns. 
Reporting “fraudsters” to external authorities (with 
such action presented in the informed consent) is 
most invasive, and though it may be intended to serve 
as a deterrent, it may be seen as punitive. Conduct-
ing a face-to-face Skype interview and collecting IP 
addresses is less invasive, but poses more concerns 
than storing cookies, which in turn poses more con-
cerns than searching for subjects online. 
Discussion
Given the increased possibility of fraud in Inter-
net research, strategies in the form of detection and 
prevention of such duplicate and fake responses are 
increasingly crucial, yet also pose challenges. Consid-
ering the limitations of various prevention methods, it 
is imperative that researchers use multiple methods to 
compensate for the limitations of any one approach, 
and also monitor for duplicate entries by hand 
throughout the study.74 A critical eye throughout the 
study will enhance early detection of duplications and 
fraud as well as ensure the quality of the data.
Researchers conducting online studies face difficult 
questions and tradeoffs in seeking to prevent dupli-
cate and fraudulent participation while maintaining 
and encouraging recruitment of valid subjects. It is 
vital that both researchers and IRBs remain acutely 
aware of the phenomena of “fraudsters” described 
here, and of means of detecting and preventing these 
practices. Investigators have several possible means of 
detecting and preventing such ineligible responses — 
including requesting specific personal information in 
the study or examining outside sources such 
as Facebook, Google Earth or whitepages.
com. For each study, researchers must decide 
the strategy that will be useful for preventing 
research fraud, what information about sub-
jects to request, how to convey these meth-
ods and information in the consent form, 
and to what extent these strategies may have 
undesired consequences in deterring eligible 
subjects. 
When researchers publish articles report-
ing data from their studies, they should include infor-
mation on how much and in what ways they compen-
sated participants for online studies, methods used 
for detecting and preventing fraud, and the success of 
these efforts — i.e., report rates of “fraudster” activity 
among participants to enhance the field’s abilities to 
avoid these problems. This information will increase 
understanding of the phenomenon of fraudulent par-
ticipants, provide a better overview of the study, and 
ensure data quality. 
Researchers and IRBs may also need to consider 
notifying IRBs, the Office for Human Research Pro-
tections (OHRP) and/or funders of fraudulent activ-
ity, as these involve unjustified use of grant funds (i.e., 
paying “fraudsters”), and can affect the integrity of the 
data and thus the scientific and social benefit of the 
study. Adverse events per se involve harm to subjects, 
and research integrity problems generally concern 
misconduct of investigators. However, “fraudsters” 
threaten the integrity of the research results. The 
advantage of such reporting is that IRBs and/or federal 
agencies (e.g., OHRP, the Office of Research Integrity, 
or NIH) can then readily track the extent and severity 
of the problem. The NIH should consider developing 
an organization similar to the IC3, or interface with 
the IC3 to assist in tracking and controlling fraudu-
lent research behavior. The IC3 issues periodic alerts 
regarding new internet crimes and preventions,75 and 
the NIH or OHRP could have a similar listing of new 
“fraudster” strategies and possibly the IP addresses of 
“fraudsters” and/or the common usernames they use. 
Given the increased possibility of fraud in 
Internet research, strategies in the form of 
detection and prevention of such duplicate 
and fake responses are increasingly crucial, 
yet also pose challenges.
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Clear criteria defining fraudulent behavior that would 
warrant such action would be imperative. Efforts to 
gauge the full nature and extent of “fraudsters” in 
these ways can enable researchers, IRBs, and others to 
then work together as best as possible to detect, pre-
vent, and address this problem in ongoing and future 
studies. 
IRBs need to be flexible concerning detection and 
prevention of fraudulent behavior. However, IRBs 
are not designed, either in practice or by statute, to 
protect researchers, but to protect research subjects. 
The “fraudster” complicates the definition of human 
subject in the context of IRB review and human 
subject research. Researchers cannot always plan in 
advance how participants will take advantage of an 
online survey. Kraut et al. suggests that IRBs should 
have an online/computer expert to assist with Inter-
net research in “both online behavior and technol-
ogy.”76 Such an expert could explain to the IRB what 
is appropriate in the specific study at hand, and can 
keep the IRB up-to-date on technological advances. 
As both the Internet and “fraudsters” become more 
sophisticated and online studies are conducted more 
frequently, it will indeed be important for the IRB 
to have online/computer experts to draw on to help 
facilitate and enhance the conduct of online research, 
and have IRB members make appropriate decisions 
to prevent fraud while protecting subjects. Different 
challenges will emerge over time, and in various kinds 
of studies aimed at different populations. Research-
ers and IRBs will need to choose specific strategies for 
detecting and preventing fraud in individual studies 
in order to optimally balance protecting both research 
integrity and subjects. 
Future research should test how the structure of 
online studies and the content of consent forms affect 
eligible subjects participating in studies, as well as 
how relevant stakeholders (subjects, researchers, 
research ethicists and others) view these issues and 
methods discussed here to prevent “fraudsters,” and 
the “acceptability and efficacy” of such approaches.77 
Similarly, future studies should build on Bowen et al.’s 
post-hoc finding that compensation (vs. no compen-
sation) increases the number of “fraudsters” and the 
number of entries these “fraudsters” submit.78 Stud-
ies could also examine prospectively how different 
rates and structures of compensation and informed 
consent details affect rates of duplications and/or 
fraud in a study — e.g., how rates of responses and of 
“fraudsters” vary between longitudinal studies that 
offer little or no compensation for the completion of 
initial surveys or offer equal vs. increasing amounts 
of compensation with completion of subsequent sur-
veys over time. Investigators can examine how partici-
pants perceive the methods outlined here (e.g., alter-
ing amounts, timing, or types of compensation) and 
what they feel is an appropriate level of compensation, 
which could offer important insights. Research could 
examine, for instance, whether appropriate potential 
subjects would feel less inclined to participate in stud-
ies that used each of the methods mentioned here, and 
if so, how much so. Future studies could also probe 
how these decisions might vary based on the popu-
lation, the research, and the questions posed — e.g., 
whether a method that proves effective in reducing 
“fraudsters” by, say, 70% may dissuade 1% or 40% of 
appropriate subjects. Additional challenges arise since 
a $20 gift card may be an appropriate amount for U.S. 
participants, but will be worth a lot more in poorer 
countries, potentially incentivizing “fraudsters” from 
abroad. Further investigation on how “fraudsters” 
identify studies (e.g., through websites such as swag-
bucks.com) would be valuable as well. 
The challenges that researchers and IRBs face in 
conducting Internet-based research is varied and 
evolving. As the Internet develops, “fraudsters” too, 
become more sophisticated. Norms and expectations 
of web privacy are also changing, highlighting ongo-
ing needs to understanding appropriate and effective 
means of ensuring privacy, while adequately providing 
informed consent to a study’s procedures. As the Inter-
net continues to evolve along with online research, so, 
too, should efforts to detect, prevent, and respond to 
fraud that may occur. Future research and discussions 
in this area, and reports on evolving patterns of dupli-
cation and fraud, are critical in the growing field of 
online research.
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